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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-3564 
____________ 
 
DOMMEL PROPERTIES LLC;  
LAND OF BELIEVE FARM INC; 
WILLIAM J. DOMMEL; ROBERT DOMMEL, 
                               Appellants 
 
v. 
 
JONESTOWN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,  
n/k/a JBT; LEBANON COUNTY TAX CLAIM BUREAU;  
SALLIE A. NEUIN 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 1-11-cv-02316) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 28, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  September 16, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
William J. Dommel, Dommel Properties, LLC, and Land of Believe Farm, Inc. 
(collectively, the “Dommels”), sued the Jonestown Bank and Trust Company (the 
“Bank”) for negligence, fraud, and intentional interference with contract, among other 
claims, involving alleged misrepresentations made to Mr. Dommel and a third party in 
connection with a tax sale of Mr. Dommel’s horse-breeding farm.  The United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in 
favor of the Bank.  We affirm in part and vacate in part in light of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania’s intervening decision in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co.1  
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
 Mr. Dommel and his late father, Robert Dommel,2 entered into three loan 
agreements with the Bank, borrowing in excess of $4,330,000.  The loans were secured 
by mortgages on the Dommels’ commercial horse-breeding farms (hereinafter, “Farm 
                                              
1 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014). 
2 Robert Dommel, deceased, was dismissed as a plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1).  See J.A. at 3-4. 
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One” and “Farm Two”).  The loan agreements authorized the Bank to, among other 
things, foreclose on the properties in case of default and confess or enter judgment.3 
 The Dommels were unable to make payments on their loans, and the Bank issued 
a notice of default on April 10, 2008.  The parties agreed to auction Farm One, and they 
entered into a forbearance agreement on May 28, 2008, whereby the Dommels 
acknowledged their default and the Bank’s ability to proceed with its rights and remedies 
contained in the loan agreements.  After the auction of Farm One failed,4 the Bank 
confessed judgment on the loans in the total amount of $5,173,659.  The parties 
attempted to reach a debt workout agreement, but they were unable to do so, and the 
Bank bought Farm One at a sheriff’s sale in execution of the judgment. 
 The parties continued negotiations and entered into a second forbearance 
agreement on August 10, 2009, whereby the Dommels again acknowledged their default 
and the Bank’s right to pursue its remedies under the loan agreements.  The Dommels 
remained in default, and the Bank proceeded to execute the judgment by listing Farm 
Two for a sheriff’s sale scheduled for October 11, 2011.  However, the Dommels had 
also failed to pay taxes on Farm Two, and, after they defaulted on an agreement with the 
Tax Claim Bureau, a tax sale was scheduled a month prior to the sheriff’s sale.   
                                              
3 See J.A. at 407, 466-67, 477-78. 
4 Allegedly, the Dommels threatened to sue the Bank if the Bank accepted the low 
bid price it received.  See J.A. at 12. 
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On September 9, 2011, three days prior to the tax sale, Mr. Dommel met with 
Roger Jeremiah, then-Head of Lending, and Richard Rollman, Vice President of 
Commercial Lending, and provided them a $5,000 check.  According to the Dommels, 
the check constituted consideration for the Bank’s agreement not to bid on Farm Two at 
the tax sale.  According to the Bank, however, the $5,000 went toward repayment of the 
Dommels’ outstanding loan obligations.  Mr. Dommel was given a letter explaining that 
the Bank’s acceptance of the check “in no way constitutes an agreement by the Bank to 
forbear” on its ability to pursue its rights and remedies under the loan agreements.5  Mr. 
Dommel contends that he never received the reservation of rights letter; yet, a copy of the 
letter was emailed to the Dommels’ attorney.6  In alleged reliance on their expectation 
that the Bank would not bid on Farm Two, the Dommels did not take any action to ensure 
that Farm Two was not sold.  At the tax sale held on September 12, 2011, the Bank 
ultimately purchased Farm Two as the sole bidder. 
After the tax sale of Farm Two and before the Bank obtained the deed, the Bank 
sent a letter to Thomas McClay, one of the Dommels’ largest clients, asserting that Farm 
Two now belonged to the Bank and demanding that all boarding agreements and 
                                              
5 J.A. at 791.  The Notes for two of the loans also stipulated that “[n]o course of 
dealing between Borrowers and Bank or any holder of this Note, nor any delay on the 
part of Bank or any holder of this Note in exercising any rights under this Note or any of 
the other loan documents shall operate as a waiver of any rights of Bank or any other 
holder of this Note.”  J.A. at 466, 477.   
6 J.A. at 794-95. 
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payments were to be sent to the Bank as the current owner.7  The Dommels allege that 
Mr. McClay subsequently decreased the number of horses he boarded at Farm Two. 
The Dommels sued the Bank on December 14, 2011.  After certain claims not 
relevant to this appeal were dismissed, both parties moved for summary judgment.  On 
July 9, 2014, the District Court denied the Dommels’ motion and granted the Bank’s 
motion as to the claims for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and intentional 
interference with contract.  It held that the Dommels’ claims for negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud8 were barred by the “gist of the action” doctrine, since the 
alleged misrepresentations were made in pursuit of the Bank’s rights and remedies under 
the contract, i.e., loan agreements.  As to intentional interference with contract, the 
District Court concluded that it could “find[] no evidence that the letter from the Bank to 
Mr. McClay resulted in a breach or non-performance of the boarding contract.”9  The 
Dommels timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.   This Court exercises appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
                                              
7 J.A. at 1256. 
8 For purposes of determining whether the gist of the action doctrine applies, the 
Court will assess the Dommels’ negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims together, as 
both claims arise from the same course of conduct (i.e., the Bank’s alleged 
misrepresentations).  
9 J.A. at 33.   
 6 
 
Court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment and, in doing so, “view the underlying 
facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.”10   
III. 
 We discuss the Dommels’ claims for (A) negligent misrepresentation and fraud 
and (B) intentional interference with contract in turn. 
A. 
The gist of the action doctrine precludes tort claims where the true gravamen, or 
gist, of the claim sounds in contract.11  Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not 
yet adopted the doctrine, the District Court and the parties relied on the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court’s decision in eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc., which bars a tort 
claim where it, inter alia, “aris[es] solely from a contract between the parties,” 
“concern[s] the performance of contractual duties,” or is “inextricably intertwined” with 
the contract.12  Accordingly, the District Court barred the Dommels’ fraud claim because 
“[t]he Bank made the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations in pursuit of its rights and 
                                              
10 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 274, 265 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
11 See Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 68 (Pa. 2014).   
12 811 A.2d 10, 19, 21 (Pa. Super. 2002); cf. Bruno, 106 A.3d at 67 n.14 
(explaining that “[b]oth the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as some federal 
district courts, have looked to eToll as the controlling statement of Pennsylvania law in 
this area”).  
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remedies under the loan documents,”13 and, therefore, it was “plainly linked to the 
contracts between the parties.”14  Similarly, it barred the negligent misrepresentation 
claim because it was “inextricably intertwined with the parties’ contractual obligations” 
and because “the duty of care would not arise but for the contractual relationship between 
the Dommels and the Bank.”15   
In its intervening decision in Bruno, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
expounded upon the gist of the action doctrine for the first time.16  It clarified that “[t]he 
general governing principle which can be derived from” its synthesis of state court 
decisions is that “the nature of the duty alleged to have been breached . . . [is] the critical 
determinative factor in determining whether the claim is truly one in tort, or for breach of 
contract.”17  “If the facts of a particular claim establish that the duty breached is one 
created by the parties by the terms of their contract—i.e., a specific promise to do 
                                              
13 J.A. at 42. 
14 J.A. at 43-44. 
15 J.A. at 45-46. 
16 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has applied the gist of the action 
doctrine previously, it noted in Bruno that it had not formally adopted the doctrine and 
did not necessarily do so in Bruno itself.  See 106 A.3d at 56, 60 & n.10.  Rather, it 
explained that “[a]s part of our determination of the issue we accepted for review, we 
must, necessarily, explicate the governing legal principles.”  Id. at 60 n.10.  
17 Id. at 68 (emphasis added). This is not the first time the duty-based standard has 
been articulated.  See id. at 69 (noting that the “duty-based” demarcation was first 
recognized over a century and a half ago); see, e.g., Bash v. Bell Telephone Co., 601 A.2d 
825, 829 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“Tort actions lie for breaches of duties imposed by law as a 
matter of social policy, while contract actions lie only for breaches of duties imposed by 
mutual consensus agreements between particular individuals.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The District Court itself mentioned the standard as articulated in Bash, but it 
did not apply it.  See J.A. at 41. 
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something that a party would not ordinarily have been obligated to do but for the 
existence of the contract—then the claim is to be viewed as one for breach of contract.”18  
On the other hand, “[i]f . . . the facts establish that the claim involves the defendant’s 
violation of a broader social duty owed to all individuals, which is imposed by the law of 
torts and, hence, exists regardless of the contract, then it must be regarded as a tort.”19  In 
summary, the court “reaffirm[ed]” the “duty-based” analytical framework “as the 
touchstone standard for ascertaining the true gist or gravamen of a claim.”20    
 The court then applied the standard to the facts in Bruno.  There, David and 
Angela Bruno (the “Brunos”) purchased an insurance policy requiring Erie Insurance 
Company (“Erie”) to inspect for mold and pay up to $5,000 for the cost of removal.  
Erie’s inspectors confirmed mold in the Brunos’ home on two separate occasions, but 
they erroneously determined that the mold was non-toxic and need not be removed.  The 
Brunos subsequently became ill and sued Erie for negligence in conducting the 
investigation.   
 The Bruno court first explained that whether Erie found toxic or non-toxic mold 
was “quite simply . . . not based on Erie’s violation of any of [its] contractual 
commitments,” since the Brunos did not allege that Erie failed to inspect or pay up to 
                                              
18 Bruno, 106 A.3d at 68. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 69. 
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$5,000 for removal per its obligations under the policy.21  Rather, “the Brunos’ claim 
against Erie is predicated on the allegedly negligent actions taken by its agents on behalf 
of Erie while they were performing Erie’s contractual obligation to investigate the claim 
made by the Brunos under their policy.”22 “Consequently, [the Brunos’] allegations of 
negligence facially concern Erie’s alleged breach of a general social duty, not a breach of 
any duty created by the insurance policy itself,”23 and, therefore, the claim was not barred 
by the gist of the action doctrine. 
 While the Bruno court did not explicitly overrule eToll or its progeny, it explained 
that eToll creates a divide in the gist of the action jurisprudence,24 did not rely on any of 
the eToll factors in reaffirming the duty-based standard from which eToll departs,25 and 
cabined reliance on eToll’s “inextricably intertwined” language.26  There are also 
inconsistences that the Bruno decision did not explicitly mention.  In particular, Bruno 
provides that “a negligence claim based on the actions of a contracting party in 
performing contractual obligations is not viewed as an action on the underlying contract 
                                              
21 Id. at 70. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 71. 
24 See id. at 56-57, 66-67.  
25 See id. at 69. 
26 Id. at 69 n.17 (“With respect to the Superior Court’s eToll decision, we note 
that, because that court acknowledged in its opinion this source of duty distinction and 
incorporated it into its analysis, its consideration of whether tort and contract claims 
brought together in the same action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ should be viewed in 
this context, i.e., as a determination of whether the nature of the duty upon which the 
breach of contract claims rest is the same as that which forms the basis of the tort 
claims.”). 
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itself, since it is not founded on the breach of any of the specific executory promises 
which comprise the contract,”27 whereas eToll provides that “the gist of the action 
doctrine should apply to claims for fraud in the performance of a contract.”28   
 Using eToll as guidance, the District Court did not engage in the duty-based 
analysis that Bruno advanced; rather, the basis for the District Court’s decision was that 
the Bank’s alleged misrepresentations occurred in pursuit of its rights and remedies under 
the loan agreements and were therefore “plainly linked to” or “inextricably intertwined 
with” its contractual obligations.29  Because the District Court did not have the 
opportunity to conduct its analysis under Bruno, we will allow it to reconsider its analysis 
in the first instance.30  Thus, we vacate and remand its order with respect to the negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud claims.  
B. 
As for the Dommels’ intentional interference with contract claim, we agree with 
the District Court that summary judgment in favor of the Bank was proper.  Section 766 
                                              
27 Id. at 70. 
28 811 A.2d at 20. 
29 See J.A. at 42, 43, 45.  
30 Cf. In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 186 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(vacating and remanding where the district court “did not have the opportunity to 
consider . . . later-issued guidance [by the U.S. Supreme Court] in the first instance”).  
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of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has 
adopted,31 provides: 
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a 
contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise 
causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to 
the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the 
third person to perform the contract. 
 
As one lower federal court aptly summarized, “the bulk of the case law, as well as the 
plain language of . . . section 766, mandates that a plaintiff bringing an intentional 
interference claim must allege breach or nonperformance.”32 
In the case at bar, there is no evidence indicating that the letter from the Bank to 
Mr. McClay resulted in a breach or nonperformance of the boarding contract.  Although 
the Bank’s letter did make Mr. McClay fear that his horses would be caught up in legal 
proceedings,33 at all times after receipt of the letter Mr. McClay boarded no less than ten 
horses at Farm Two and, at several points, he even increased the number of horses he 
boarded there.  Indeed, as the record makes clear, Mr. McClay’s monthly billing invoices 
                                              
31 See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 925 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin and Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1183 
(Pa. 1978).  
32 Dreiling Millennium Trust II v. Reliant Renal Care, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 429, 
434 (E.D. Pa. 2011); see also Windsor Sec., Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 655, 
660 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that “the paradigm interference tort” under Pennsylvania 
law is one “in which a defendant . . . causes a third party to breach its contract with the 
promisee-plaintiff”); Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 644 A.2d 188, 191 (Pa. 
Super. 1994) (explaining that an intentional interference claim must show that “the 
defendant interfered with the performance of [the] contract by inducing a breach or 
otherwise causing the third party not to perform”). 
33 See J.A. at 512. 
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demonstrate that the number of horses he boarded significantly fluctuated over the 
relevant time period.34  Moreover, nothing in the record shows that the boarding contract 
between the Dommels and Mr. McClay required Mr. McClay to maintain a certain 
number of horses at Farm Two.  Thus, the Dommels fail to establish that Mr. McClay 
breached or failed to perform any obligations under the contract and, as a result, fail to 
establish a cognizable intentional interference of contract claim. 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate in part and affirm in part the order of 
the District Court. 
                                              
34 J.A. at 1121-39. 
